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ings, represents the typical approach to the problem of distinguishing
12
between a servant and an independent contractor.
JAMES WEHLE

LANDLORD AND TENANT: OPTION TO
RENEW AS CONTEMPLATING A NEW LEASE
Leibowitz v. Christo, 75 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1954)
Plaintiff, successor to lessee of a ten-year lease, sought a declaratory
decree determining the rights of the parties. The lease gave lessee
the option of "additional annual renewals" for fifteen years beyond
the original term. Plaintiff submitted proper notice of his election
to renew, as required by the lease, and continued in possession of the
premises after the expiration of the original term. Defendant lessor
contended that plaintiff had no rights under the lease, since no new
lease was executed. On appeal from a decree for plaintiff, HELD, use
of the word renewal does not require the execution of a new lease.
Decree affirmed.
From an early date courts have recognized a distinction between
an option to renew a lease and an option for its extension.' It has
been almost universally held that, in the absence of a contrary provision in the lease, an option to extend may be exercised by merely
holding over after expiration of the term and paying the stipulated
rental.2 The original lease is then a present demise of the combined
terms.3
One aspect of an option to renew has not received universal
sanction. The technical definition of renew is "to make new again,",
2

1 See Magarian v. Southern Fruit Distributors, 146 Fla. 773, 1 So.2d 858 (1941).
'Delashman

v. Berry, 20 Mich. 292, 4 Am. Rep. 392 (1870): Orion v. Noonan.

27 Wis. 272 (1870).
2E.g., Nicklis v. Nakano, 118 Colo. 317, 195 P.2d 723 (1948); Fragomeni v. Otto
Gratzel Signs, Inc., 121 Ind. App. 167, 96 N.E.2d 275 (1951); Klein v. Auto Parcel
Delivery Co., 192 Ky. 583, 234 S.W. 213 (1921); Quinn v. Valiquette, 80 Vt. 434, 68
Atd. 515 (1908).
3McClelland v. Rush, 150 Pa. 57, 24 At1. 354 (1892); Murray v. Odnian, 1 Wash.2d
481, 96 P.2d 489 (1939).
4WVEBSTER, Na:W INTERNATIONAL DICrONARY 2109 (2d ed. 1949).
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and under the traditional doctrine an option to renew contemplates
the execution of a new lease. Nothing less will suffice to exercise the
option. Most jurisdictions have wandered away from this traditional
concept, though a few still follow it.r
Many courts recognize the theoretical difference between an option
to renew and one to extend but hold that the intent of the parties determines whether a new lease is required.7 Under this view, the fact
that a lease uses the words option to renew does not of itself require
the execution of a new lease. If the language of the lease and the
practical construction accorded it by the parties do not show that a
new lease was contemplated,.none is required.8
Other courts draw a distinction between the two types of options
but hold that a new lease is not a prerequisite to the exercise of an
option to renew. Under this view, however, a mere holding over after
the expiration of the original term is not sufficient to exercise such
an option. The lessee must perform some affirmative act that will give
the lessor constructive notice of the election to exercise the option.9
Still other courts following this rule state that an option to renew is
different from an option to extend in that the former imports the
giving of some type of actual notice to the lessor. 10
Some jurisdictions recognize no difference between an option to
renew a lease and one extending it. These courts agree that holding
over by the lessee is sufficient to exercise either an option to renew or
an option to extend, and that the original lease acts as a present demise
for the extended period."I
.',E.g., Keith v. McGregor, 163 Ark. 203, 259 SAW. 725 (1924); Ackerman v. Loforese,
111 Conn. 700, 151 AtI. 159 (1930); Hindu Incense Mfg. Co. v. Mackenzie, 335 I.
App. 423, 82 N.E.2d 173 (1948); Whalen v. Manley, 68 W. Va. 328, 69 S.E. 843 (1910).
First Nat'l Bldg. Corp. v. Harrod, 175 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1949); Citizens Oil
Co. v. Head, 201 Ga. 542, 40 S.E.2d 559 (1946).
.E.g., Keith v. McGregor, 163 Ark. 203, 259 S.W. 725 (1924); Howell v. City
of Hamburg, 165 Cal. 172, 131 Pac. 130 (1913); Blanck v. Kimland Realty Co., 122
Conn. 317, 189 At. 176 (1937); Economy Stores v. Moran, 178 Miss. 62, 172 So.
865 (1937) (by implication).
sAckerman v. Loforese, 111 Conn. 700, 151 Adt. 159 (1930).
oHindu Incense Mfg. Co. v. Mackenzie, 335 111. App. 423, 82 N.E.2d 173 (1948);
Andrews v. Marshall Creamery Co., 118 Iowa 595, 92 N.W. 706 (1902).
10Shamp v. White, 106 Cal. 220, 39 Pac. 537 (1895); Bergstein v. Bergquist, 152
Minn. 358, 189 NAV. 120 (1922); Whalen v. Manley, 68 W. Va. 328, 69 S.E. 843
(1910).
"E.g., Jador Service Co. v. Werbel, 140 N.J. Eq. 188, 53 A.2d 182 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1947); Corvington v. Heppert, 156 Ohio St. 411, 103 N.E.2d 558 (1952); Haddad
v: Tyler Production Credit Ass'n, 212 S.W.2d'1006 (rex. Civ. App. 1948).
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There is no logical reason for requiring execution of a new lease in
the exercise of an option to renew. A lease is both a contract and a
conveyance. The intent of the parties, therefore, should control the
effect to be given the lease contract. This intent should not be defeated because of a mere theoretical difference in the meaning of the
terms renew and extend. These words are often used synonymously by
businessmen. A further advantage of the "intent of the parties"
theory is its flexibility. In applying this doctrine the courts are free
to consider the equities of the case in arriving at a decision. Furthermore, the execution of a new lease involves expense and inconvenience,
and yet the new lease is no more beneficial than the old one. Courts
should be hesitant to subject the parties to this inconvenience unless
it is clearly contemplated by them.
In Florida, as in many other states, the lessee is a tenant at sufferance or at will when he holds over after the expiration of the term."2
The lessor, in such cases, may not be aware of the fact that the lessee
intends to exercise his option.- " Therefore, unless holding over is
specifically intended to exercise the option, some affirmative notice
of election should be given the lessor.
The Florida Supreme Court faced this issue squarely for the first
time in the instant case. In an earlier case' 4 the lessee was given a
renewal option to be exercised by written notice thirty days prior to
the expiration of the original term. Although he did not give notice
until twelve days before expiration, the chancellor decreed that the
lease was extended, on the grounds that the lessor knew of the lessee's
intent and that he was not damaged by the delay. Even though the
present issue was not considered in the opinion, the Court seemed to
assume that the lease would be continued, without a new lease, upon
proper exercise of the option.
In the instant case the Court avoided drawing any distinction
between an option for extension of a lease and one for its renewal.
The Court felt that the use of renewal rather than extension did not
necessitate a new lease, since the lease did not provide for it and the
lessee had otherwise complied with the requirements for the exercise
of his option. This decision follows the weight of authority in giving
effect to the intent of the parties. Most courts have reached the same
1-FLA. S'rAT. §83.04 (1953).

i3See Koss Holding Corp. v. Liquori, 99 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afJ'd nmer.,
277 App. Div. 857 (lst Dep't 1950).
l4Dugan v. Haige, 54 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1951), 5 U. FL.%. L. REv. 338 (1952).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol8/iss3/11

4

